1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA 4 5 6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4:13CR3121 7 September 7, 2016 Plaintiff, 8 12:05 p.m. 9 Lincoln, Nebraska VS. 10 11 JOSEPH J. BENZ, 12 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 VOLUME I of I 17 TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 18 BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD G. KOPF 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE 20 21 A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S: 22 23 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. STEVEN A. RUSSELL Assistant U.S. Attorney 24 25 100 Centennial Mall North Suite 487, Federal Building 26 27 Lincoln, NE 68508 28 29 MR. ROBERT B. CREAGER FOR THE DEFENDANT: 30 Attorney at Law 31 1630 K Street 32 Lincoln, NE 68508 33 34 DIGITAL OPERATOR: CONNIE SCHULTZ 35 36 LORI J. SEHNERT TRANSCRIBER: 37 General Reporting Service 38 610 J Street, Suite 20 39 Lincoln, NE 68508 40 41 42 43 44 Proceedings recorded by digital sound recording, transcript produced 45 by transcription service. 46 47

THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're on the record now in

(Wednesday, September 7, 2016, at 12:05 p.m.)

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3 United States versus Joseph Benz. The case number is 4:13CR3121. 4 The matter comes on for sentencing. 5 Counsel, please remain seated, but now enter your appearance. 6 7 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, please enter the appearance of Steven Russell on behalf of the United States. 8 9 MR. CREAGER: Judge, Bob Creager, 1630 K Street, 10 Lincoln, for Mr. Benz. 11 THE COURT: And, Mr. Creager, could I ask you to pull 12 that mic closer to you? 13 MR. CREAGER: Is that better, Judge? 14 THE COURT: It is. May I confirm with you, Mr. 15 Creager, that you have discussed the presentence report -- and 16 I'm talking now about the revised presentence report -- and any 17 addendum with your client and have shown him a copy? 18 MR. CREAGER: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: That, then, takes me to the presentence 20 report itself. My understanding is that there are no objections 21 to the presentence report, but Mr. Creager has filed a motion for 22 a variance. Is that -- do I have the status of this matter 23 correctly? 24 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. The Government has no 25 objection to the presentence report.

1 THE COURT: You did object to my tentative findings. 2 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. And, quite honestly, Judge, I'm not 3 sure at what point in the proceedings I need to formally object on the record to the vacating of the receipt charge. So --4 5 THE COURT: So you herewith object? 6 MR. RUSSELL: I do. 7 THE COURT: And I herewith deny. MR. RUSSELL: And I would also object that there was 8 9 not -- to the Court's earlier finding that there was not enough 10 evidence of distribution, and I'd just simply do that for the 11 record as well. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. That objection is overruled. 13 Then, back to my original question. There are no 14 objections -- assuming my earlier rulings are what they are, my 15 understanding is no one objects to the presentence report? 16 MR. RUSSELL: That's correct, Your Honor. 17 MR. CREAGER: We filed no substantive objections to the 18 report itself, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And like you -- or like the Government's 20 lawyer, you think I heard, when I prohibited you from presenting 21 psychological testimony regarding the knowledge component of the 22 crimes --23 MR. CREAGER: Correct. 24 THE COURT: -- you thought that you did not have to

present an insanity defense in order to present that testimony

and I disagree with you, and I presume you renew your objection at this time?

MR. CREAGER: Yes. At some point, we'll just have the historical discussion of how we got here in this unusual circumstance, but that's -- yeah, that's part of it. We proceeded on that basis that we had to proceed with the insanity defense.

THE COURT: Right. Well, let's do that, then, just a brief summary, and you tell me whether you think I'm wrong. Mr. Benz was charged in a two-count indictment. One count alleged possession of child pornography and the other count alleged receipt and distribution of child pornography. There was a non-jury trial -- well, during the course of the proceedings, prior to the non-jury trial, Mr. Creager asserted that he should be allowed to present psychological testimony -- well, with respect to the question in the statute about knowledge, and I denied that for the reasons that are articulated in the file. I found that the statute -- both statutes did not require that the defendant know that what he was doing was unlawful. In other words, I found there was no specific intent requirement in the relevant statutes.

Are you both in agreement with me up to this point?

MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. CREAGER: Yes. And I think procedurally what happened was, I first gave notice of my intent to offer

psychiatric testimony on the question of his knowledge and/or capacity diminished by the effects of the Pramipexole. And we went through a series of motions, and the reports were submitted, and the Court then ruled in -- on the record that the offense was a general-intent crime, not a specific-intent crime, and under Eighth Circuit authority, diminished capacity type evidence, psychiatric testimony on the defendant's intent or state of mind is not relevant or admissible on general-intent crimes. Then we later, in light of Dr. Newring's subsequent analysis, gave notice of the insanity defense.

And then, once we did that, we crafted this procedure whereby, to preserve the diminished capacity defense, we would have a bench trial and get at least the evidence on the record of what this drug did or didn't do to Mr. Benz. And so --

THE COURT: And, in the interim, Dr. Benz was evaluated at a federal medical center and so we then had a non-jury trial in which we had two extraordinarily good psychologists testify, and I found that Dr. Benz had met one prong of the insanity defense, but not the second prong, which meant that he was guilty of both offenses, and I so found and I articulated in a memorandum and order.

After I made that finding, Mr. Creager alerted me to the fact that, because I had also found that the evidence was insufficient on distribution, my recollection is that the program that the Government found operating did not have an on and off

1 switch, unlike LimeWire. 2 Are you with me to this point? 3 MR. CREAGER: Yes, Your Honor. 4 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Creager suggested that I had 6 the power and the obligation to vacate one of the crimes, because 7 the Eighth Circuit had held that if you have a possession crime and a receipt crime, they are essentially the same, and you can't 8 9 punish somebody twice for the same conduct. 10 Then the question became which finding of guilty should be 11 vacated? If I vacated the possession crime, that left the receipt crime in place, which, in turn, triggered the statutory 12 13 minimum sentence of 60 months. I looked very hard at the law and 14 concluded that I have the discretion to vacate the greater or the 15 lesser in terms of penalty. For reasons which I've articulated 16 earlier, I vacated the greater, which means that Mr. Benz would 17 be found quilty of one crime and that will be the --18 Is that Count 1, Mr. Russell? 19 MR. RUSSELL: It's Count 2, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: -- Count 2 of the Indictment, and not Count 21 1, because they're the same crimes. 22 After that, I ordered a presentence report. It was 23 conducted and submitted. Mr. Creager filed his variance motion. 24 I issued tentative findings in which I gave the parties notice

that I independently was contemplating a variance to probation.

1 The Government, in turn, objected to my tentative findings in a 2 timely fashion, and that, then, I think, is a fair summary of 3 where we stand today. 4 Do you all agree? 5 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. MR. CREAGER: Yes, Judge. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Creager, can we take up your variance motion at the time of allocution? 8 9 MR. CREAGER: Yes, Judge, that would be the best way to 10 handle it. 11 THE COURT: In order to do that, what I must first do 12 is calculate the advisory guidelines. We have a total offense 13 level of 27 and a criminal history category of one. 14 guideline range is 70 to 87 months in prison. The supervised 15 release range is five years to life. The defendant is ineligible 16 for probation under the guidelines, but is eligible for probation 17 under the statute. Probation range is one to five years under 18 the statute. The fine range in this case is \$12,500 to \$125,000. 19 There are three restitution claims here totaling \$77,500, and a 20 special assessment of \$100 is required. 21 Counsel, have I accurately stated the advisory guideline 22 ranges -- well, let me back up. There's also a forfeiture in 23 this case that must be imposed and that's one Apple MacBook

laptop; a Sabrent external hard drive, 250GB; a 500GB external

Sabrent hard drive; and one Black Cruzer 4GB flashdrive.

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1 have I accurately stated the correct advisory guideline calculations and related information? 2 3 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor, with one exception. 4 Yesterday, I received a fourth victim restitution request that I sent to the Court by email, along with Mr. Creager and Mr. 5 6 Holder. I have a copy of it if the Court wishes to look at it. 7 THE COURT: Well, isn't it too late? MR. RUSSELL: Well, I just want to make sure, if I 8 9 received it, I sent it to you as soon as I received it, and I did 10 that. 11 THE COURT: When did you send it? 12 MR. RUSSELL: I sent it yesterday to Kopf@ned.courts. 13 I'm not sure if that's the right --14 THE COURT: That's not my direct email. That's -- I'm 15 not being critical of you. 16 MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. 17 THE COURT: You may or may not know. I have a personal 18 email and I have a Kopf email, where everything in the world 19 dumps into it; proposed orders. I've not seen it, I don't 20 think --21 MR. RUSSELL: I have a copy. 22 THE COURT: -- so, let me take a recess. We'll go pull 23 up that email. 24 MR. RUSSELL: I also have a copy of it here in court,

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if the Court wishes --

1 THE COURT: Oh, do you? If you want to, give it to me. 2 MR. RUSSELL: May I approach, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Sure. This guy complains about the short 4 notice. When does the restitution notices go out? 5 MR. RUSSELL: I don't know exactly when they went out, 6 Your Honor. I know that as soon as there was a finding of quilt, 7 we had the other three restitution claims --8 THE COURT: Yeah. 9 MR. RUSSELL: -- and it's from the same law firm. 10 MR. HOLDER: Your Honor, it's my understanding, in 11 speaking with Kim Roewert, that attorneys are registered with the 12 The FBI is the agency responsible for obtaining these 13 victim statements. 14 THE COURT: Yeah. 15 MR. HOLDER: So, as soon as there's a case where a 16 victim has been identified, these attorneys are notified. So 17 they're -- it's my understanding that they're notified as soon as 18 their victim -- their client has been identified as a victim in a 19 case. 20 THE COURT: Well, that would've happened long ago. 21 MR. HOLDER: That's my understanding of the procedure, 22 Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Well, I'm inclined to say it comes too 24 I mean, we're in the middle of sentencing. And I'm not

being critical of you. I'll leave the bench here in a minute

and -- you say it came to Kopf -- the Kopf email?

MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. I sent a copy to Mr. Creager. He has his copy. And I bet it happened yesterday between 1:00 and two o'clock in the afternoon.

THE COURT: We were somewhat busy yesterday dealing with the Beatrice 6 case, so it's possible that -- I don't see it. Would've been in the afternoon, you say?

MR. RUSSELL: I believe so. I sent the same email to Mr. Creager and to Mr. Holder.

MR. HOLDER: My email was time stamped at 2:21, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, J.R.

Nope, I didn't get it in my personal email. If you don't mind, I'll take a break and we'll call up the other one and find out, so I can confirm on the record that I rec- -- that one of my email accounts received it. But I'm inclined to deny this. I mean, Mr. Holder, our probation officer, tells me that the claim that -- given the short time between the notice of the defendant's sentencing -- I mean, if these people are notified even before sentencing by the FBI -- and this is Jessica --

Do you know anything about Jessica?

MR. RUSSELL: I mean, I -- just so the Court's clear, I know the Jessica series is a well-known series. I know that it is on file with the Department, that information. That information is in -- as soon as there is a conviction -- I know,

at least as soon as there is a conviction, victims who have been identified are notified and that comes through our victim witness coordinator. So, the other three victims submitted material --

THE COURT: Long ago.

MR. RUSSELL: Yes. And, like I say, I got this yesterday and immediately forwarded it on, I thought, to you and to the attorneys.

THE COURT: Well, if I deny this, then I've got to make a report to Congress, literally, but I'm -- which I don't care.

Let me go check. I'll check to see if we got it.

MR. RUSSELL: If you don't mind, Judge, I'll go down to my office and get the sent email so that you know exactly when I sent it.

THE COURT: Well, then you can make a record -- you can tell the Marsh Law Firm that I just said it came too late and -- but you made a record for them. And I suppose they can -- there's a question about jurisdictionally what they can do, but that's their problem. But I don't want the record to be unclear, so why don't you do that and I'll go do it. We stand in recess.

(Off the record.)

THE COURT: Please be seated. We're back on the record.

Counsel, at 2:21 p.m., my email -- there's no secret about this, it's in the local rules or available on the net,

1	<pre>Kopf@ned.uscourts.gov, received a forwarded email well,</pre>
2	received an email addressed to Judge, Bob, and J.R. It says, "I
3	just received the restitution request on the Jessica Series.
4	Please let me know if you have any questions. Thanks, Steve."
5	And he attaches "Mr. Russell from" some lawyer in New York, and
6	then the letter. So, I didn't see it yesterday. First time I
7	saw it is when I came to court just now. I'll mark this as
8	Court's Exhibit No. 1 and receive it into evidence unless there's
9	an objection.
10	MR. RUSSELL: No objection, Your Honor. The only thing
11	I'm concerned about, when I sent that to you, I had not checked
12	to see whether it should've been redacted. So, I would ask that,
13	for the purpose of this hearing, it be
14	THE COURT: Sealed?
15	MR. RUSSELL: marked as a restricted document, yeah.
16	THE COURT: You want it sealed or restricted?
17	MR. RUSSELL: Restricted, I think, would be fine.
18	THE COURT: Okay. It'll be the exhibit is
19	restricted. Did you clarify the procedure when you were down
20	there, when you went back to your office?
21	MR. RUSSELL: I did not, Your Honor. I was checking to
22	make sure about the timeline with respect to the email, but I do

THE COURT: Can you think of anything why these folks

know what the procedure is and --

couldn't have responded earlier?

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MR. RUSSELL: Not when the other three did. I mean, that's the concern I have, is, I don't know why -- because everyone who is listed on that report -- on the NCMEC -- the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children prepares a report. When we get that, we -- I don't know what the right term is -- cross-match it with victims who are in a database of the Department of Justice. They are sent notices. My guess -- and we see this in a couple of cases. It's not like this is unusual that we may have -- we'll have two different cases that both have the Vicky Series. One case there'll be a request for restitution and one case there will not. And a lot of that is the internal procedures within their own law offices, where some will hit and some will not. I can't tell you why this one was sent to me the day before the sentencing. I just know that as soon as it was, I sent it up to you just to be on the safe side because I think I have the obligation to do that. So, that's -- I mean, I don't mean that in a --

THE COURT: No.

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MR. RUSSELL: -- I just mean I wanted to make sure that you had the request as soon as I received it.

THE COURT: No. You did -- the only thing you have -- and I don't mean this in any way as a criticism, but you have access to my -- what I'll call my real email, my day-to-day email, and on something like this --

MR. RUSSELL: Quite honestly, Judge, I should've

checked that. I just clicked "Kopf" and I thought I hit every email that I -- in my system.

THE COURT: I'm not being critical. I understand why you did it and you notified me. I mean, I -- it just matters how fast I can react.

Okay. I'm going to deny the Jessica request from the Marsh Law Firm for two reasons. Number one, it comes far too late.

And, number two, it's insufficient. It makes a bunch of statements -- it's a well-written memorandum, but it hasn't got any supporting data that -- there's a letter from the mother. It doesn't have anything about -- no detail about money, about how the child is getting along. Apparently, she's now 17. The law firm says, "We have not yet had the opportunity to retain experts and prepare formal forensic or damage reports." Well, that's not my problem. They want a 60-day continuance. Apparently, they are asking for it one day prior to the sentencing hearing, and I don't think that's fair to Dr. Benz to delay sentencing anymore. So, I'm denying it for two reasons: one, it came too late; two, it's insufficient; and I therefore reject it.

Do you want any further ruling, Counsel?

MR. RUSSELL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thanks.

So, let's go back so the record is clear. We have a 27-1. Custody range is 70 to 87 months. Five years to life, supervised release. The defendant is ineligible for probation under the

1 guidelines, but not the statute. Fine range is \$12,500 to \$125,000. There's a total amount of restitution requested in the 2 3 sum of \$77,500, and I'll get to the specific -- well, just for 4 the record, those victims are the Vicky Series, the Sarah Series, and the Casseaopeia Series. And the special assessment is \$100. 5 6 There's a forfeiture required, as I've indicated earlier. 7 Now, have I stated the correct advisory guideline 8 calculations and related information given my ruling? 9 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 10 MR. CREAGER: Yes, Judge. 11 THE COURT: I have prepared a sentencing summary that 12 I'll have counsel -- pardon me, I'll have the CRD hand out 13 to -- one to Mr. Russell, two to Mr. Creager, one to the 14 probation officer, and then I'll hear the parties on allocution. 15 I'll give you an opportunity to read it and then you can address 16 it during your allocution. 17 Are you ready, Counsel? 18 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Let me hear from the Government. 20 MR. RUSSELL: Well, obviously, Your Honor, we object to 21 the imposition of a term of probation rather than a term of 22 imprisonment. We believe that a term of probation in this case 23 does violate the tenants of 3553 --24 THE COURT: Which one?

MR. RUSSELL: -- in that there is no pers- --

1 THE COURT: Which one? 2 MR. RUSSELL: -- there is no grounds for a variance. 3 Specifically, Your Honor, with respect to the physical condition 4 of the defendant, I do understand that the defendant suffers from 5 a number of medical conditions. However, that's not a 6 determining factor in varying downward from the sentencing 7 quidelines. 8 THE COURT: But that --9 MR. RUSSELL: This is a unique -- I'm sorry, Your 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: But that's not the only reason for the 12 variance. MR. RUSSELL: Well, I think I should -- for the record, 13 14 I should separate them out and then we can talk about them 15 together. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. RUSSELL: But, with respect to the physical 18 condition, the reason why I don't believe that it is a proper 19 grounds for variance of any magnitude in this case is because 20 this is a case where the defendant has spent time in a Bureau of 21 Prison setting. He did not have a problem with being in --22 THE COURT: Oh, he fell. 23 MR. RUSSELL: But, Your Honor, I understand he fell, 24 but I think that the determination of the Bureau of Prisons was

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that they could --

MR. RUSSELL: -- they could accommodate his -- yeah.

Well, I mean, it's not -- he's not going to be the first or the last prisoner who has a problem at a medical center with either falling or having a concern. What I'm saying is, I think that the Bureau of Prisons was able to adequately deal with that.

There is no -- there was no determination that there was a problem with his physical condition as it currently exists that they can't take care of it. I'm not saying that things will never happen, but I'm saying that for purposes of a downward departure, that is not an appropriate grounds solely for a downward departure or, quite honestly, Your Honor, even in combination with other factors.

The second ground that the Court has is that the defendant would not have committed this crime but for taking this drug. I don't agree with that. I don't think that's what the evidence shows. And, quite honestly, I don't think that's even what the Court's determination was when the Court found the defendant guilty of receipt that the Court's now vacating. Because you can't look at this crime at the time — in a context anything other than a continuum. Whether you say he wouldn't have started downloading child pornography, the 21,000 images of child pornography that we have, whether you say he wouldn't have started that at some point — you even indicate he understands the wrongfulness of his actions. He knows what he is doing is

wrong and he continues to do what you say he knew was wrong. So, you can't, in isolation, say, "Well, he wouldn't have done this crime but for the Mirapex," but on the other hand, he would've continued the crime because that's exactly what happened here. Whether we want to get to the sentence of probation, the facts show that he knew what he was doing was wrong. He never, ever told the doctor about what he was doing. He knew it was wrong and he continued to do it. And so when the Court says you want to vary because he would not have done this, you're negating all of the factors that indicate that he knew it was wrong and he continued to do it.

THE COURT: No. I can -- I said that he was acting like a vigilante, that he knew that he was seeing child pornography, and there was a reason for him acting as a vigilante, and I can go into that in detail if you care to. But it's -- the drug manufacturer warns people that if you take this stuff, you will engage in compulsive behaviors, including online gambling, which occurred in this case, crazy spending, which occurred in this case, and hypersexuality, which occurred in this case. Now, there is no evidence that Benz was doing anything illegal prior to his ingestion of Mirapex. Isn't that right?

MR. RUSSELL: That's right, Your Honor. He was not uncovered -- he was not discovered by law enforcement until --

THE COURT: Until after --

MR. RUSSELL: -- yeah, until after 2007.

1 THE COURT: Until after he was on Mirapex. 2 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Yeah. So, I've concluded that, but for the 4 ingestion of Mirapex, he wouldn't have done this. 5 MR. RUSSELL: But my point, Your Honor, is that you're 6 saying he would not have started. I understand that's the point. 7 What I'm saying is that when you say that the drug manufacturer says these are side effects, the next thing the drug manufacturer 8 9 says is, "If you have these side effects, notify a doctor." 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. RUSSELL: He didn't do it. He continued to --12 THE COURT: Well, that's hardly surprising given the 13 nature of the drug. 14 MR. RUSSELL: No, no. Judge --15 THE COURT: The reason they have the warning for the doctors is because people on this drug -- as a matter of fact, if 16 17 you look further at the literature, doctors are told that they 18 will not -- many of them will not recognize their symptomology. 19 MR. RUSSELL: Because, Your Honor -- that's my point. 20 Because, if I like to gamble and I got on Mirapex, I may gamble 21 more. I understand that. If I have -- if I spend, if I shop, 22 and I'm on Mirapex and I shop more than I have before, doctors 23 are made aware of that. What I'm saying here, in this case, is, 24 what Dr. Benz did was, he did something that you just now said,

"The Government couldn't prove he did it before this." Well, so

this is totally out of the nature of anything that ever happened to him.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RUSSELL: And now, all of a sudden, he continues -- he doesn't notify a doctor and he continues this activity. I think that puts him more in the context of somebody who knows what he's doing is wrong and continues to do it. And, in 3553, what the Court is asked to consider is how the nature of this -- character of this offense occurred. And here what you have is a person who not only -- I mean, Judge, it's just -- there's so many inconsistencies here. You're saying -- not you, but I mean the evidence in this case is that Dr. Benz not only just downloaded stuff to -- as a vigilante, he also moved the stuff to other hard drives.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RUSSELL: You can't say that, Judge. You can't say that he moved it to other hard drives because he wanted to continue vigilante work. He moved it to a thumb drive that we found at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. That is not consistent with a person who is merely trying to look for and do vigilante work. That's -- I'm sorry, that's totally inconsistent. And what I'm saying is, when you look at varying from a 70-month sentence that Congress believes, even under 3553, the Court has to consider significantly different. I just don't believe the continuum of this offense is significantly different

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that warrants a probationary sentence. I understand the Court saying, "You should vary" -- I mean, look, I have to acknowledge the guidelines are here. I have to acknowledge that I think the guideline sentence is appropriate. But I will indicate to the Court, I understand the Court varying, because even Dr. Boutwell says that there is some inhibition of self-control. I mean, there is a lessening of the -- there is a lessening of self-control, but that does not warrant a sentence of no term of imprisonment. You should sentence Dr. Benz to a term of imprisonment, whether it be the 32 months that Probation recognizes or a higher sentence, which is what the Government would recommend. To not impose a term of imprisonment, I believe, is wrong. I believe that is contrary to what the prescripts of 3553 talk about, both in nature of the offense, the recommendation for deterrence. I think all of those things are taken into account and I will simply leave it at that.

THE COURT: With respect -- I'll take your two last points in reverse order. With respect to deterrence, I do not need to be overly concerned with the general deterrence here because this case and the utilization of Mirapex for a person with MS and RLS is unique, and the number of other people who would be generally deterred is vanishingly small.

Secondly, with regard to specific deterrence, there is absolutely no reason to believe that once the doctor got off Mirapex, he is likely to re-offend. With respect to the nature

and circumstances of the offense, there is no doubt that the defendant was hoarding child pornography. The compulsion, the hypersexuality, however you want to describe it, is a product of the drug. And your argument that he should've recognized that, "My inhibitions are substantially diminished" flies in the face of the medical science. People on this drug frequently do not know that their inhibitions are substantially lowered. And I'm persuaded that had he not taken Mirapex, and had he not had MS and RLS, that this crime wouldn't have been committed. That, coupled with the fact that there's no question that he's substantially physically impaired, suggests to me that a variance to probation is entirely justified.

Do you have anything you'd like to add?

MR. RUSSELL: There is no study that Dr. Newring provided that says that a person of -- when we talk about hypersexuality, most of the cases that Dr. Newring talked about were cases where a person has sexual -- I mean, people like sex, and people would do something in addition to the sex. There is no study that says that people on Mirapex start looking at child pornography, that -- matter of fact, there was no study that even said that. So, the idea that the Government is doing something totally outside the science, there was no science about it, Judge. There's no science that says, "You're going to start taking -- you're going to start looking at child pornography."

And my point is, when you're talking about hypersexuality, I

understand hypersexuality. This is something so totally inconsistent that when doctors ask you, "Are you having any problems?" and you say, "No," knowing that you're doing something that you believe is so totally inconsistent, that, in and of itself, is a red flag to me. And when you continue to do it -- I mean, you're saying he was hoarding it. Dr. Newring says he wasn't trying to possess it. Dr. Newring says all he wanted to do was receive it so he could discard it as he wanted. But, yet, his actions aren't -- they belie that action. They belie that idea. The idea is that he was trying to keep this stuff. That's the whole point. And so, when you put it on a thumb drive, when you take it with you places, when you put it on hard drives, you are doing things that are not just compulsive in terms of a drug. You are doing things that are compulsive in terms of what you want. You are doing exactly like compulsive gambling.

THE COURT: If that were the case, the Government would have evidence that this man downloaded child pornography before he began taking Mirapex.

MR. RUSSELL: Well, how do you know that? We -- how would you know if he changed his computer? How would we know if he --

THE COURT: What we do know, from everything, is this man's personality completely changed. His president of the faculty said he was a tenured professor. He took his autistic child, who became an eagle scout -- there wasn't anything prior

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to the taking of Mirapex that would indicate that this man was inclined to do what you say. So, to suggest that the Mirapex wasn't the causative factor -- it may not have been the only causative factor, that gets into all sorts of extraordinarily difficult questions, it seems to me, about what his psychological state was at the time he took the drug. But to suggest that the Mirapex didn't cause this crime is just wrong.

MR. RUSSELL: Judge, no. I'm not suggesting that the use of the Mirapex had no effect. I think even Dr. Boutwell will indicate that it had some effect. What I am saying is, when you say that, "For that 2007 to 2009 time frame, this would not have occurred except for the fact he was taking Mirapex," we don't know that. What we know is, is that he was taking affirmative steps between 2007 and 2013 or '14, whenever we did the search warrant, to not only maintain child pornography, to find it, to use different types of file sharing programs that would hasten his ability to get child pornography, and that then he was keeping it. That's what the evidence shows. Now, I agree with you. You may say what point in time that occurs. I'm just telling you that at the point in time between 2007 and 2014, you even indicate that he knows what he's doing during that period of time is wrong. And if that's true, that he knew what he was doing was wrong, then there had to be some type of other event that occurs. I mean, he has -- I mean, why wouldn't you tell -- my point of view is, why wouldn't you tell the doctors?

1 Why wouldn't -- when the doctor's asking you whatever's happening, you would say it. Now, you may disagree with that. I 2 3 understand that. I'm just saying that that is my contention. 4 THE COURT: Sure. 5 MR. RUSSELL: For purposes of a variance, you not only 6 have to look at what occurred at the start, but what occurred 7 during that period of time. 8 THE COURT: And I --9 MR. RUSSELL: And the idea that you're saying, "Well, 10 he showed no evidence before this." Judge, we have had so many 11 cases in this district of child pornographers that we don't have 12 any clue about anything they do until the time that we actually 13 catch them. 14 THE COURT: Yeah, but we have 50 years of his life in 15 front of us that is entirely exemplary. If you want to talk 16 about other cases, let's do that. You tell me anybody we've had 17 in here who's had life experiences similar to Dr. Benz, who's 18 lived a life as exemplary as he has. Nobody. 19 MR. RUSSELL: James Haugh. 20 THE COURT: Who? 21 MR. RUSSELL: James Haugh. 22 THE COURT: Who's James Haugh? 23 MR. RUSSELL: That was a Judge Gerrard case. James 24 Haugh was a lifetime life insurance salesman, had a great job in

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Grand Island --

1 THE COURT: He didn't take Mirapex.

MR. RUSSELL: He didn't take Mirapex, I grant you that, but he had an exemplary life, no problems. We find him with child pornography.

THE COURT: No, that's my point. With the Mirapex, if you've got 50 years of behavior that is entirely legal, and then the guy starts taking this drug that the FDA requires them to warn about its potential, it's really hard for me to think that the fact that he continues to -- the fact that his inhibitions continue to be reduced does not suggest -- I guess the simplest way to say it, I think this case is so unique, I've not had anything closely resembling it.

MR. RUSSELL: I don't disagree with that, Your Honor.

I really don't. I'm not -- that's not my point. My point is, is that when the Court looks at a variance to this degree, I don't believe that a variance to this degree is warranted.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RUSSELL: And I would -- it is not my intention here -- I am trying to show deference to the Court. I'm trying to be as respectful as I can --

THE COURT: You are.

MR. RUSSELL: -- and I'm not trying to argue with you.

I'm just trying to indicate what the Government's position is

with respect to why we believe that a variance --

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. RUSSELL: -- is not -- either not warranted in this case or certainly not to the degree that the Court is indicating, and I'll leave it at that.

THE COURT: Are there any -- I don't mean this to wave a red flag in front of a bull, but are there any other 3553(a) things you want me to especially consider?

MR. RUSSELL: Well, I think the Court is -- I also don't want to raise the red flag either, Your Honor. I think the Court is incorrect in the adequate deterrence. I believe that we really don't know about specific deterrence here, because Mr. Benz was found and arrested at a time when he was taking Mirapex. So, we don't know what his future conduct is going to be. I do believe that specific deterrence is important in this case, but I also believe that general deterrence is important, that you -- that if, when you come into a court, when you want to argue things like this and you want to take this to a trial on both a receipt and a possession charge, I believe you should be found -- you should be sentenced on the receipt. And, because of that, I believe that a five-year sentence is warranted at a minimum. I believe that for general deterrence as well. I grant you this is a unique case, Your Honor. I understand all the arguments that you've already made about that. I simply do not believe that general deterrence is being served with a probationary sentence.

With respect to the -- providing any medical care, I think

that medical care can be provided by the Department -- the Bureau of Prisons. I don't -- I mean, with respect to future crimes, again, that's already been addressed. I don't really need to do that. So, with those statements, I think I'm done. So, thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Russell, we've known each other long enough to know that there's virtually nothing you could do to offend me. You're always respectful, and you're passionate, and you're zealous, and that is as it should be.

Mr. Creager?

MR. CREAGER: I hardly to know where to start and maybe that's an indication that I shouldn't start at all. But when you tell the story of Mr. Benz from where he was to where he is, sitting next to me as a convicted sex offender in possession of child pornography, lost his job, his tenured position over this, to be arguing these fairly intricate arguments about what Mirapex did or didn't do just is strange. Because I agree, everybody, perhaps except Mr. Russell, agrees that the drug caused us to be here. And I will tell you this. I was skeptical at first. "The drugs made me do it." Yeah, I've heard that. "The alcohol made me do it." Yeah. "My anger made me do it." Everybody has sort of an excuse that something else made me do it and we lawyers say, "Yeah, we've heard everything at least once and sometimes twice," and we know what works and doesn't work. But then Dr. Newring chimes in and he starts to say, "Hey, I'm skeptical,

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too." But, as you look at the study, it took a while for the pharmaceutical industry to figure out what they had created when they created Mirapex. And there's other drugs like it. It's not just Mirapex. And my recollection of the timeline was simply that when they gave this drug to him, there were no warnings. He was given no warnings. The doctors didn't have warnings. I think the warnings came about much later, maybe -- I think your Court's Exhibit whatever -- I forgot the number -- you look now and the warnings are everywhere. But the carnage that preceded the warnings was remarkable. And the studies that Dr. Newring talked about became so overwhelming and they're general acceptance in the pharmaceutical/psychological community that finally Mirapex stopped defending its own drug and puts this warning out that it causes normal people do to crazy things. think it's fair to Mr. Russell to say it causes crazy people to do crazier things, but that doesn't mean it doesn't cause people that really have no penchent -- and let's talk about that. When I wake up every morning, the first thing I say to myself is, "You know, I'm not going to kill anybody today, because I might go to prison." There are people that probably get up in the morning and say, "I'm not going to do something illegal, because I'm going to go to prison." We naturally moderate our conduct, our own psychological balancing. When I decide to speed on my way to court because I'm late, I can decide to speed or not. "Well, I won't speed, because I'll get" -- we do this all the time. And

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some people have a better handle on making those judgments than others. Right down the line, others kind of veer off course from time-to-time, basically -- but they're in the line and there's just people way off in the weeds. Dr. Benz didn't have any trouble with the line. Dr. Benz was a rock star professor. He was everything that I think, as a young child, if he'd grown up to be the Dr. Benz that was there, he'd have been proud of himself. His family was proud of himself. And then, boom, off the cliff he goes.

I believe, honestly -- and we had this debate and I lost it round one, I don't think it is irrelevant that what he was doing was affected by a drug that made him do things that he wouldn't otherwise have done. I call that diminished capacity. The Court calls it, sort of, insanity. But let me ask this question. somebody held a gun to his head and said, "Download child pornography or I'm going to shoot," is that a voluntary act? know it's wrong, but what's making me do it is some outside influence over which I have no control. And, to me, Mirapex was the metaphorical gun held to his head that was making him do things, and the things that moderate conduct, "Should I do it? Should I not do it? Am I going to get in trouble? Am I not going to get in trouble?" Those were gone. The Mirapex effectively tipped the balance in favor of, "Just do whatever your brain is telling you to do." There isn't that thing in psychology, I guess, that -- that DNA in our brain that wants us

to comply with rules. I wish I could've been successful on this first phase of this case and gone to a jury and tell them his story. They might have said he's not guilty of anything. But we'll have that battle as to whether this is a specific-intent crime, a general-intent crime, whether the evidence should've been considered for that purpose or not. That's baked into the cake. But even the State's -- the Government's expert really didn't dispute Dr. Newring at the core. There were little changes around the wording, around the edges, but even the Government's expert understood that Dr. Benz was acting in response to whatever chemically induced behavioral changes
Mirapex caused, and that just seems so clear to me that I don't even know why we're debating.

If you take that away, if you take --

THE COURT: I think what Mr. Russell is -- and I don't want to speak for him -- but I think he's saying, "Remember, Kopf, you found that he" -- well, let's --

MR. CREAGER: You found that I failed on insanity because he did things that suggested he knew it was wrong and the -- and isn't the -- I had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that -- or we had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that that component of the insanity defense had to exist for him to be found not responsible by reason of insanity.

THE COURT: Well, I found that there was a mental defect.

MR. CREAGER: Yes. And --

THE COURT: And then I found that there are -- as the Seventh Circuit has articulated, there are three ways of knowing something is wrong. Subjectively, your client did not believe what he was doing was wrong because he -- because, in his state of mind, he was searching for someone who had harmed him and his sister. And he thought that his behavior was, therefore, justified.

MR. CREAGER: Justified, yes.

THE COURT: That's the -- that's one way of looking at the statute. Virtually, no court has said that that's insanity. You either -- well, there are two other tests and it doesn't matter which one we apply here. He met them because he recognized, I found, that what he was doing, even though he thought it was morally justified, he hid from others. And that suggested to me that you couldn't prove up - you failed to prove up -- we're doing lawyer talk now, this is not a criticism -- on the second element of the insanity defense. Go ahead.

MR. CREAGER: And so, in the end, I suppose a variance off the guidelines are just that; guidelines. There are sentencing purposes in the statute, and there are typically the hard-fact cases, where you really can't look and find anything like it anywhere. And I tried. I think, even in the preliminary days, I'm arguing with the Court about where this evidence fits on the continuum from irrelevant, to diminished capacity, to

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insanity. I couldn't find anything where this convergence of facts and circumstances, and drugs, and drugs at a time when it was unknown that it caused these side effects, to compare it to. But I think it's more appropriate to look at Dr. Benz as if he was forced to do something against his will, rather than doing something in furtherance of his will. In other words --

THE COURT: Well, that sort of used to be the law until a crazy guy shot President Reagan and then the law was changed.

MR. CREAGER: Yes. And if there's anything in my judgment that's not adequately factored into the guidelines or into the vari- -- or the departure issues that normally accompany the guidelines -- we just went right to variance. We didn't go through departure because I think it's all basically one and the same at this point. Dr. Benz, sitting here, didn't commit this offense. It's just that simple. Something happened that the law needs to deal with, and if the law can't excuse him, if the law can't say that, "We understand that what you did was totally out of character, and it wasn't even anything that you did because you were mad, you were angry, you were pissed off, you were depressed." I mean, "We are -- you did something because somebody gave you something that they didn't understand would cause you to do things." Where in the guidelines do we find that? We don't. Where, in the case law, do we find discussions about just how unusual that is? I think probably it's a once-in-a-lifetime case and this may be it. Because, unless

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there's somebody in the pipeline, I think the warnings are out there. I think those people will now understand more carefully and look out for these changes in personality, go back to doctors. They will now recognize that, "Oh, my gosh" -- and Mr. Russell is wrong about one thing. Dr. Newring's opinion became much more persuasive, at least to me and perhaps to the Court, when he said we actually saw the change in the effect that Mr. Russell says we didn't get to see. He either ran out of it or stopped taking it for a period of time and his wife testified that there was -- in a short period of time, the old Joe was coming back, but the desire to get him back on the medication to treat the condition overcame whatever signals there were, and he went back to being the troubled Joe. So, my recollection is, Dr. Newring says that is gold. You actually have a period of time in which we were able to evaluate Joe's character, personality issues, when he was off the drug and the history was pretty clear that those traits, the Joe that disappeared, came back. So, he was even more persuaded that Mirapex was at the core of the conduct simply because he had an opportunity to see in real time Mr. Russell's argument that, "Well, we don't know what would happen after he came off the Mirapex, whether he would've still been involved in child pornography." It's an interesting argument, but Dr. Newring basically, I think, closed that door when he said, "Look. I actually have evidence here that the old Joe came back."

And then, of course, I think his testimony was also that there was a time after that, before he was indicted or charged, that when he went off the drug, he was better, and then, on into -- maybe it was after the indictment. But you heard the testimony from the family member, the re-emergence of Joe Benz, the rock star college professor, came back. So, Mr. Russell thinks putting him in prison for 32 months serves some deterrent. I don't know who it's going to deter. It's not -- Mr. Benz couldn't have been deterred under those circumstances because he wouldn't have been able to understand the deterrent value of it because his whole psychological mental frame of mind was warped by a drug. I don't know that there's anybody else out there that would -- that could be deterred, and what punishment does he deserve at this point that he hasn't suffered from the collapse of life as he knows it?

So, when you look at the purposes under 3553 of sentencing, he suffered enough. The law did not serve him well, generally speaking. We're trying to get to a just result. I don't know why the Government couldn't have taken some of this into consideration. We tried to resolve it. I took a big gamble, didn't I? I took a huge gamble going to trial, not taking a plea, all the stuff that comes along with it, because there are significant legal questions here. But where we are right now today, based upon the evidence adduced at the trial, based upon the Court's findings, your proposed variance, whether it was mine

or the one set forth in the presentence to Probation, makes perfect sense, and it may be the only just sentence that could be imposed in this case. I think you're 100 percent right on; that's what should happen. Probation seems entirely appropriate through variance, departure, or whatever mechanism that gets there. And he'll figure out how to live the rest of his life as a felon and a registered sex offender.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Dr. Benz, you have the right to speak before I sentence you. You're not obligated to speak, but you certainly may if you wish. Would you like to say anything?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, no, thank you.

THE COURT: Alright. After considering all the statutory goals of sentencing and the advisory sentencing guidelines, I impose five years of probation and vary downward on my own motion to probation. I do so because of the defendant's physical condition and due to the fact that I am persuaded that the offense would not have occurred but for the prescription drug Mirapex the defendant was taking as a result of his multiple sclerosis and the associated symptoms of restless leg syndrome. The defendant's affliction is an unpredictable and disabling disease of the central nervous system that confines the defendant to a wheelchair or requires the use of leg braces and other assistive devices.

In addition to the standard conditions of probation, the

1 following special conditions are imposed and they are set forth 2 in the sentencing summary that I will mark as Court's Exhibit 2, 3 and counsel have had an opportunity to review that, I believe. 4 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 5 MR. CREAGER: Yes, Judge. 6 THE COURT: Insofar as restitution is requested, and 7 following the case of U.S. against Fast, F-a-s-t, a case that I decided, I award Vicky restitution in the sum of \$3,333; Sarah, 8 9 \$3,333; and Casseaopeia, \$3,333. The total, then, is \$9,999 to 10 be paid during the term of probation as set forth in the special 11 conditions. I do not impose a fine largely because it would 12 interfere with the defendant's requirement of restitution, and I 13 do require that he pay the \$100 mandatory special assessment. 14 Counsel, that is my judgment and sentence. Do you have any 15 questions about it? 16 MR. RUSSELL: No, Your Honor. 17 MR. CREAGER: Nothing further, Judge. Thank you. THE COURT: Do you want any further elaboration of my 18 19 statement of reasons? 20 MR. RUSSELL: No, Your Honor. 21 MR. CREAGER: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Alright. Dr. Benz, it's my obligation to

tell you of your right to appeal. Appeal means to have a higher

Court review what I've done. That higher Court is in St. Louis.

It's called the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

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you file a notice of appeal within 14 days of today's date, that higher Court will review my handling of this case, but it's got to be filed, the so-called notice of appeal, within 14 days of today's date. It's not hard to do. You can write on a piece of paper, "I want to appeal," and file it in the court file. Your superb lawyer, Mr. Creager, will do that for you if you instruct him to. He must. And the lady who sits in front of me here, the court clerk, will do it for you if you tell her to. The important point is, it's got to be done within 14 days of today's date or you lose your right to appeal. In a moment, we will adjourn these proceedings and then the court clerk will give you a piece of paper that summarizes your appeal rights. It is at that time that you may speak with her and tell her to file a notice of appeal and, if you do, she will.

Do you have any questions about your right to appeal, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: This is me personally. In my view, this case is -- and I'm not being critical of the Government -- this case is an utter tragedy. And I think maybe Mr. Creager's right; there are some times when the law is an ass and this might be one of them. We stand in recess.

(Recessed at 1:28 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE I, Lori J. Sehnert, court-approved transcriber, certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcript from the official digital sound recording provided to me of the proceedings made in the above-entitled matter. ____s/Lori J. Sehnert DATE: October 17, 2016 Signature of Approved Transcriber INDEX **GOVERNMENT EXHIBITS:** Offered Received Restitution Request from 1. Victim Jessica (Restricted Document) 2. Sentencing Summary (Restricted Document)